Suppose that a bankruptcy judge has two options in a b proceeding of a factory. First, the judge could reorganize t resulting in a $1,000,000 payment to creditors and keeping largely intact. Second, the judge could liquidate the factory, re $1,500,000 payment to creditors and the loss of 1,000 jobs as t is shuttered. What should the bankruptcy judge choose? Co law and economics analysis dictates shuttering the plant to ma return to creditors and thereby maximize efficiency. Contrar vailing view in law and economics, this Article argues that dur high unemployment the judge should instead choose reorg order to preserve jobs, despite the lower payment to creditors can reduce the suffering caused by unemployment while a costs to taxpayers.
The argument rests solely on economic efficiency. D around recessions,1 an inefficiently large number of peopl ployed, and both worker surplus (the gain that workers receiv cost of providing labor) and producer surplus (profit Keynesian stimulus programs seek to rectify this inefficiency employment in two ways. First, stimulus increases employmen through increased government hiring and spending. Second stimulus does so indirectly through the "Keynesian multi Keynesian multiplier refers to the process by which an in government spending or reduction in taxes increases consu ing among beneficiaries of the spending or tax cuts, in tur employment among those who benefit from that increased spending; these newly employed people spend more mo 1. A "recession," as used in this Article, is a time when the economy significantly below its potential output, with consequent underutilization elevated unemployment. It does not mean just a contraction in econom the term is sometimes technically taken to mean. See US Business Cyc and Contractions, Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, http://www.nber. US_Business_Cycle_Expansions_and_Contractions_20120423 .pdf [http:/ /p YVYZ] (last visited Sept. 26, 2016 ) ("The NBER does not define a recession in consecutive quarters of decline in read GDR Rather, a recession is a signif economic activity spread across the economy ...."). their own incomes have gone up, thereby causing the cycle self.2 The government spends to mitigate the pain and red ciency losses of high unemployment in two ways. First, durin high unemployment, governments typically spend money to ployment.3 Indeed, the government spent over $800 billion w in mind in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of Second, since more people are unemployed at these times, spending on social-insurance and income-support program Raising money through taxes to fund Keynesian job-creation increased payments to unemployed workers, however, distort to work and save.5 This Article argues that, instead of inc inefficiencies to increase employment during recessions, in so is more efficient to incur other, but smaller, inefficiencies -i reorganizing rather than liquidating some firms that are m to creditors and owners liquidated. Yes, doing so would reduce creditors and make it less likely that creditors will inves harming businesses. But preserving jobs through bankru sometimes avoid reducing incentives to work and savelarger inefficiency caused by tax increases to pay for em increasing government spending.
If taxes were not distortionary, bankruptcy law ideally wou to sustain employment, since tax-funded spending could d causing distortion. But in a "second-best" world, where there least one distortion, adding a second distortion does not ne crease, and can in fact decrease, the total amount of distor Article applies such reasoning, suggesting that bankruptcy law an additional distortion by considering employment e nonetheless reduce the distortion overall by reducing the dist taxation. The Article proposes that bankruptcy law weigh t (1) the costs to creditors and businesses from pres bankruptcy and (2) the taxes necessary to fund pr employment. On the one hand, if -with the goal bankruptcy courts do not maximize the return to cre lose more money. Furthermore, future creditors, kn do this, will be less likely to lend to businesses, w correspondingly. One can think of the distortion courts' consideration of job preservation as an "employment preservation tax"7 on creditors. On the other hand, if bankruptcy courts do not seek to preserve jobs during recessions, a government seeking to maintain employment will face increased expenditures on socialinsurance and employment-stimulus programs, which means that the government must at some point raise taxes to fund those obligations. These taxes reduce work and investment and make the economy worse off. The fact that the government must raise funds through distortionary taxes means that even "nonideal" policies may be best when they coexist with other policies like distortionary taxes.
This Article first proposes "counter-cyclical bankruptcy rules" that calibrate how much bankruptcy judges consider the employment effects of a bankruptcy proceeding based on where the economy is in the business cycle. If labor markets are working properly and unemployment rates are low, then the bankruptcy judge should not consider employment effects and instead focus on maximizing return to creditors. If labor markets are not working properly and unemployment rates are high (so that a job saved at a reorganized firm is likely to lead to a reduced unemployment rate), then the bankruptcy judge should return less to creditors in some cases, thereby saving jobs and, in turn, saving the government money. The rules this Article proposes have substantial scope for affecting employment and efficiency by way of preserving through bankruptcy both fewer jobs during times of low unemployment and more jobs during times of high unemployment: From 1980 From through 2012 there were over 1.7 million business bankruptcy filings,8 and approximately 1,000 were large, publicly traded corporations that employed over 7.4 million workers before their filings.9
7. See Professors Thomas Jackson and David Skeel add that promoting economic recovery through the appropriate allocation of capital is another benefit of maximizing the value to creditors. Thomas H.Jackson 8c David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy and Economic This Article arrives at a kind of midpoint in the debate ov tent to which bankruptcy law should consider "communit beyond the interests of the firm's owners and creditors, such employees, customers, suppliers, and the local community. history suggests that Congress intended for the bankrupt support employment.11 "Traditionalist" bankruptcy scholars l
Elizabeth Warren have argued bankruptcy should consider concerns.12 In recent decades, though, efficiency-minded onomics scholars have questioned this emphasis. These "pr suggest that bankruptcy should maximize the return to c shareholders.13 This Article assumes the normative goal of ef finds that pursuing efficiency sometimes supports the ar bankruptcy should consider employment effects. It also provi for positions taken by some academics for why the bankru should consider community concerns.
10. See Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 77 (arguing that bankruptcy law should have a variety of goals, including co ests); see also Karen Gross, Failure and Forgiveness: Rebalancing the Bankr (1997) (arguing for inclusion of community interests in the bankruptcy R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 91 Co 720-21 (1991); cf. Douglas Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Reply to Warren, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 815, 824-26 (1987) (arguing bankrupt maximize returns to creditors). This Article supports some elements of t Professor Elizabeth Warren in this famous debate with Professor Douglas B 11. When it introduced the current Chapter 11 in 1977, the Hous Committee wrote in its report that:
The purpose of a business reorganization case ... is to restructur business's finances so that it may continue to operate, provide its empl with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a return for its stockholders It is more economically efficient to reorganize than to liquidate, bec it preserves jobs and assets.
H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 220 (1977) (emphasis added) . This language has the Supreme Court to mean that " [t] he fundamental purpose of reorgani vent a debtor from going into liquidation, with an attendant loss of jobs a use of economic resources." NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984) . The Court also said that bankruptcy courts should "balanc [e] the interests of the affected parties -the debtor, creditors, and employees . . . [including] any qualitative differences between the types of hardship each may face." Id. at 527. Citing the same language, the Court in United States v. Whiting Pools , Inc. said that, "[b]y permitting reorganization, Congress anticipated that the business would continue to provide jobs, to satisfy creditors' claims, and to produce a return for its owners." 462 U. S. 198, 203 (1983) .
12. JefTFerriell 8c Edward J. Janger, Understanding Bankruptcy § 1.02 (2013) ("A key difference between the proceduralists and the traditionalists concerns whether bankruptcy should be used to advance goals of stakeholders other than creditors."); Warren, supra note 10, at 788-93 (arguing that bankruptcy law should seek to promote broader community and distributive interests).
13. See, e.g., Ferriell & Janger, supra note 12, § 1.02 ("[Bankruptcy should do nothing more than preserve value for creditors by seeking to eliminate the inefficiencies that are inherent in atomistic state collection proceedings."); Baird, supra note 10, at (arguing that bankruptcy policy should seek to maximize returns to creditors). This Article does not take a position on wheth should consider employment effects more or less overall but rather proposes what bankruptcy law s does so. In particular, this Article offers a method an for implementing a simple cost-benefit rule that cons hoc judicial discretion exercised in considering em Many law and economics scholars of bankruptcy l "pro-reorganization" or "procontinuation bias" in stands.14 This Article argues that when unemplo tendency toward reorganization, consistent with ap intent, is appropriate; a job saved in bankruptcy employment, reduce hardship for workers, and s money.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I situates this Article in the debate between the "traditionalists" and "proceduralists" in bankruptcy law and also, more broadly, in the debate about "efficient" legal rules. Part II develops an efficiency-based normative framework for assessing when bankruptcy judges should take into account the employment effects of bankruptcy. Part III explains how these rules could be implemented in practice. Part IV gives an example calculation of how a bankruptcy judge could evaluate the benefits of preserving jobs through reorganization.
Part V responds to potential critiques.
I. Efficient Bankruptcy Law and Efficient Legal Rules

A. The Broader Debate About Efficient Legal Rules
The debate over whether bankruptcy should aim to maximize shar holder and creditor returns is part of the broader debate over wh legal rules or taxes (or, in Corp. Fin. 95, 101 (1993) (arguing th U.S. bankruptcy system is systematically prodebtor because it has "strong incenti maintain the firm as a going concern even when it is worth more in liquidation"); Lyn LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control -Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of Bankruptcy Code?, 57 Am. Bankr. L.J. 99, 106-07 (1983) (noting that, under form sion of Chapter 11, bankruptcy prcoeedings could not be for the sole purpo liquidation).
15. The debate has largely been framed in terms of "redistribution," but the choice is equally relevant here. Important articles in the debate are Louis Kaplow 8c Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. Legal Stud. 667, 674-76 (1994) (arguing that legal rules should be "efficient," and all redistribution should take place through the income tax) and Chris William Sanchirico, invest and work, thereby wasting about $0.33 with each m raised.16 However, by the "one-third rule," if deviating from a legal rule results in a distortion that costs less than oneamount of money that no longer needs to be raised through t court should adopt that deviation.17 Indeed, that is the ef rule. Using terminology developed in other work, this Article what some might consider an "efficient" bankruptcy rule return to shareholders -is actually merely an "i-efficient" That is, it is efficient only internally to the relations betwee their creditors, investors, and other parties that underlie ban But it is not efficient considering the global effects of the r placing unemployed workers on programs for which taxpayer Article takes as its goal global efficiency, defined as the wealt by the entire economy, including the costs of other spend programs impacted by legal rules the bankruptcy system has B. "Community Concerns') " ProceduraHsts " Versus ' Traditionalists " in B
The debate in bankruptcy law about "efficiency" has be "traditionalists," who support consideration of "community c and "proceduralists," who want bankruptcy law to maximize t the assets leaving bankruptcy. The traditionalists, in par congressional language that indicates promoting employme of bankruptcy law.20 Indeed, the Supreme Court has found th "congressional goal of encouraging reorganizations."21 So the ists argue that bankruptcy judges should act to preserve empl the name of these broad non-efficiency-based criteria. 18. Id. at 2483, 2487 (defining an i-efficient rule as a "rule that is efficient (i.e., wealth-maximizing based on individuals' willingness to pay) in the narrow 'internal-tolegal-rule' context").
19. "Community concerns" are conceptually distinct from the idea of shareholder representation in corporate governance. This Article proposes a remedial, not a structural, point.
20. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text (discussing bankruptcy law traditionalists) .
21. United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U. S. 198, 204 (1983) (finding that property seized by the 1RS prior to filing a reorganization petition must be turned over to the debtor under 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (2012) and relying on congressional intent as evinced in legislative history, H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 367-68 (1977); S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 82 (1978) ).
In contrast, the proceduralists argue that bank maximize the value of the firm exiting bankruptc that there has traditionally been a pro-reorganization bias relative to the efficient baseline.22 They point to Court cases and legislative history cited by the tradit of that bias. Law and economics scholars have bankruptcy rules lead to an inefficient procontin example, Professors Yeon-Koo Che and Alan Schw prohibition in § 365(e) (1) (A) of the Bankruptcy clauses," which excuse the solvent party from perfor when the other party becomes insolvent, is inefficient This Article does not claim that there should be tions relative to the status quo but rather that courts over the business cycle those reorganizations driven b ployment. When applying the normative framework (i.e., pursuing efficiency), there should be some co ment. Moreover, this concern should be considered w the economy's current place within the business cy actually largely supportive of the law and economics procontinuation policies. It supports counter-cy dependent employment-sustaining decisions rathe consistent procontinuation bias like ipso facto clauses to bankruptcy law26 and that effectively "juice" the f creditors at all times.
II. Model of Bankruptcy and Employment
A. Background Macroeconomic Literature
This Article is also part of a small, but growing, literature on how should respond to macroeconomic concerns. For example, Professo Listokin makes a forceful argument that the lack of macroeconomic siderations in tax law is quite problematic. This effect does not occur during times of low unemploym times and places of "low" unemployment, there are still unem workers. When a liquidated firm then lays off workers, they will unemployed for some period of time. However, this "frictional" e ment results in what economists call the "natural rate of unemplo defined as the level of unemployment resulting from job-matchin tions in "normal" times, when the economy is neither stressed no heated.39 It ought not be addressed through bankruptcy law there is little reason to think that preserving the jobs in a bankru would actually increase overall employment: That frictional emplo is to a large extent inevitable, and preserving more jobs at bankru would do little to reduce it.40 Rather, without the Keynesian m that results when the economy is operating below its normal capa employment is above the natural rate, it is not worth the loss to and the distortion to creditor behavior that results from preservi at the expense of creditors. That distortion itself is likely to redu ployment. For the same reason, there are costs to having emp protections that make it difficult to lay off workers, as such pro may actually increase unemployment.41 A separate issue in deciding when and where bankruptcy law s consider employment is whether it ought to consider employm places of high unemployment when the national unemploymen low. This is an interesting question, but one that is beyond the this Article, since the underlying economic causes of the localized ployment are less clear. This Article will examine the pres temporarily high unemployment rates in certain locations as a rea consider employment effects more strongly, but it will use an national unemployment as the trigger for purposes of counter In some bankruptcies C will be large, either because of the large difference between liquidation and reorganization value or because of the small number of workers whose jobs are preserved. In other bankruptcies C will be small, either because of a small difference between liquidation and reorganization value or because a large number of workers' jobs are preserved. The key concern for a bankruptcy judge or policymaker is the level of C below which firms should be reorganized despite the loss to creditors. Law and economics scholars have generally argued that whenever C is greater than 0, the firm should be liquidated. first method for estimating the value of a saved job uses the "shadow value" of a job that is implied by the amount the government recently spent to maintain employment.44 That is, a way to determine the value to the government of maintaining employment is to see how much it actually spent to do just that. Presumably the government would take into account all benefits -aggregate stimulus, increased tax payments, avoided social-insurance and income-support payments, and anything else that members of Congress believe is important to their constituents.
The analysis here focuses on the value of preserving a job during the Great Recession through the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act. Estimates of the amount that the government spent to preserve a job vary cheaper than preserving other jobs, which could lead to conclusions like partial reorganizations.
43. W is based on the employment after reorganization, not before, which is important since reorganizations often result in layoffs.
44. One paper taking a similar approach is Orley Ashenfelter & Michael Greenstone, Using Mandated Speed Limits to Measure the Value of a Statistical Life, 112 J. Pol. Econ. 226, 227 (2004) (using the preferences revealed by speed limits adopted by political processes to measure the value of a statistical life) .
widely, from an estimate of $26, 000, 45 up to the Administrat mate of $125, 000, 46 and congressional Republicans' estimates nite cost.47 This analysis implicitly makes two rather heroic first, that the government was optimizing; second, that it kn good guess about) the cost of its actions. Nevertheless, the gov best guess in 2009 may be the best guess now. Since the Admi estimate of $125,000 to maintain a job-year is the official esti rather high (despite the Administration's incentives to m low), this Article will use this figure as a baseline assumption By this calculation, a firm should be reorganized when the cost resulting from paying less to creditors is less than the e resulting from G, the government spending to create or p for a year. That is, a firm should be reorganized when:
Efficiency cost y J < Efficiency Cost{G)
Taking the right-hand side of the inequality first, the efficiency of government spending to create a job-year is equal to (a) the gross of raising a dollar of government funds minus (b) the social value of spending (of course, beyond the benefits of job preservation, whi present on both sides of the inequality) . The gross cost of raising a to preserve a job is a well-studied concept in economics, known a marginal cost of public funds (MCPF),48 which is equal to the extr lar raised plus the distortion to working and investing that results f raising that dollar of revenue. Then the social value of the good ( road), service (e.g., medical care), or transfer payment (e.g., Security payment) provided must be subtracted from the MCPF t the efficiency cost. This Article defines Value{G ) as the value of spending, ignoring the benefits of job preservation. Thus, the re comparison is that a firm should be reorganized when: Turning to the left-hand side of the inequality, arising from the reduced payments to the creditors c ponents. First, future creditors are less likely to lend they know that they may lose out if there is a bankr nesses and causing another distortion.49 But second, t bankruptcy at hand get less money. That money is lo is, there is a crucial difference between the efficiency a firm that is worth more when liquidated and taxing tion. In the case of an "inefficient" reorganization, good, service, or transfer is provided. Assets are s manner that reduces returns to creditors -pure de ignoring the benefits of job gains, which governmen duces). Hence, no equivalent of the value of gov should be subtracted from the cost to creditors. Ther is no offsetting gain from spending apart from the e the efficiency cost of the "inefficient" reorganization the financial loss to creditors plus the cost of th behavior.
To implement the rule in practice, these values need to be estimated. As noted earlier, the MCPF is a well-studied estimate. The best estimate is that it costs society about $1.33 for the government to raise a dollar of revenue.50 Estimating Value(fi ) is more difficult, since the spending could take many forms. Determining the value of government transfers is easy: The value of a lump-sum payment to an individual of one dollar is simply one dollar (again, ignoring any employment-creating benefits). Assessing the value of a road is harder; it could range from zero dollars for a "road to nowhere" to more than a dollar for a valuable public good.51 This Article conservatively assumes as an illustrative baseline that the value of a dollar of government spending is a dollar, since this is true for at least the large portion of government stimulus spending used for tax rebates.
Estimating the left-hand side of the equation involves somewhat more guesswork. The efficiency cost of changing firms' investment behavior ex ante in anticipation of lower returns upon bankruptcy is not well known.52 However, these lower returns are essentially an expected tax on 49. Note that this distortion would likely be somewhat mitigated by the reduced wages that employers could pay to employees with counter-cyclical bankruptcy rules. Since workers would value the increased insurance over keeping their jobs in recessions, they would demand lower wages, making businesses more profitable and making creditors more willing to lend. 52. Indeed, the effects could be heterogeneous, as they differentially affect different types of creditors, investors, and borrowers. In the lead up to a potential recession, this proposal could tighten credit to firms at risk of bankruptcy because the proposal would creditors. Though the ratio of the creditor distortion to the MCPF part of a parameter in the formula, as a baseline illustration, assum simplicity that the "tax" resulting from paying less back to firms to the MCPF, which incorporates the financial loss to creditors resulting distortion to their behavior.
In this Article, a represents the ratio of the distortion from ge taxation (i.e., the MCPF minus the value of government spending) t distortion from the "tax" on creditors. In general, then, a firm sh reorganized when
Under the illustrative assumptions used here, a = 0.25.53
The next step to understanding when a firm should be reorganized is to determine W9 the number of job-years of employment that results from preserving a firm. Two types of jobs can be preserved: direct and indirect jobs. Direct jobs are those directly saved at the firm (and its competitors). Indirect jobs are those that result from the Keynesian multiplier, whereby those employed consume goods and services, resulting in additional employment.
To measure the direct employment effects of a layoff, one must consider at least two ancillary effects. First, more workers may be hired elsewhere as the products that would have been sold by the liquidated firm are produced elsewhere. Second, laid-off workers compete with other unemployed workers for a limited number of jobs, making it harder for those other unemployed workers to get jobs. Assume as a baseline that these two effects just offset each other, so that the number of jobs saved at a firm is a good approximation of the total direct jobs created in the economy. This assumption will be valid in some contexts but not in others. For example, if the firm went bankrupt due to foreign competition, then at least in the short run few American workers may be hired as a result, since foreign producers would be picking up the slack. In that case, the true total effect on unemployment may be underestimated, because the laid-off workers from the bankrupt firm would be competing reduce expected payouts from those firms to creditors in the case of bankruptcy. Such an impact might reduce the extent to which bankruptcy judges should seek to reorganize rather than liquidate firms in the name of preserving employment because tightening credit could worsen a recession.
53. The reason is that Efficiency cost < MCPF(G) -Value(G ) implies, followin the argument above, that < MCPF(G ) -Value(G ). Consider that it costs $1.33 to transfer a dollar of government-raised money, which has a dollar of non-job-related be fits, while (by assumption) it costs $1.33 to transfer a dollar from creditors, which has nomjob-related benefits. Thus, MCPF < MCPF(G) -Value(G) implies that 1.33^ with and increasing the unemployment rate for exist workers without the bankruptcy creating any new jobs a producers.
The number of direct jobs preserved then must be converted into a number of direct job-years preserved, since some employees quickly find jobs and others do not. The way to estimate the total effect on unemployment is to follow laid-off workers and see how long they stay unemployed.54 Ideally, one would estimate time to re-employment for workers laid off due to bankruptcy, since workers laid off under such circumstances may stay unemployed for longer than those let go for other reasons. Workers laid off due to bankruptcy may be unemployed for longer, both because their skills are less likely to be in demand and because the local labor market may be glutted with unemployed workers; alternatively, they may be unemployed for a shorter period of time because the layoffs are less likely to be tied to poor performance. The best available evidence, though, is on "displaced" workers -that is, those laid off because their plant or company closed or moved, their position or shift was abolished, there was insufficient work, or a similar reason.55 Work by labor economist Henry Färber shows that workers laid off during the Great Recession had an average unemployment duration after layoff of at least fifty weeks; many workers laid off then still had not been re-employed when they were surveyed years later.56 The Article labels as I the average unemployment duration avoided by directly preserving a job through reorganization.
The indirect employment effects then need to be added to these direct employment effects. Prior work estimates the size of this Keynesian "multiplier" during the Great Recession to be around two.57 That is, every worker directly employed results in another worker indirectly employed. The number of workers directly employed as a result of reorganizing instead of liquidating is denoted D and the multiplier is 54. Labor economists calculate this using the Kaplan-Meier survival curve. See Bruce D. Meyer, Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Spells, 58 Econometrica 757, 762-66 (1990) (applying the Kaplan-Meier survival curve to unemployment).
55. Färber, supra note 36. This analysis constructs this estimate of fifty weeks as follows: Färber shows that 43.7% of workers had been re-employed by the time of the survey; they had an average unemployment duration of 13.4 weeks. Id. at 37-38 app. at tbls.10 & 12. The remaining 56.3% of workers were not re-employed at the time of the survey. Id. at denoted m. Estimates of the effect of government spend employment already include the indirect jobs, so no multiplier sh added to the government spending side of the equation. Accor firm should be reorganized when
where J is the value of preserving a direct job at a firm through reorganization. That is, a firm should be reorganized when the cost of L-R preserving a job there is less than the value of persving a job (/)• Using the baseline set of assumptions that (1) "taxing" creditors and taxpayers yields the same distortion; (2) a dollar of taxpayer spending is valued at a dollar; (3) the only benefit of reorganizing firms when L > R is job creation (yielding, along with (1) and (2), a = 0.25); (4) the number of job-years resulting from a reorganization instead of liquidation is equal to the fifty weeks of unemployment for each worker who would have been employed by the reorganized firm (Z = 50/52); (5) the jobs multiplier m equals two; and (6) the government's "shadow value" of a job during the recession (G) is $125,000 per job, then J = $60,096.58 That is, a firm is worth preserving when the cost per direct job to creditors is less than $60,096.59 Of course, one can make different assumptions and better estimates may arise, but the framework remains useful even if the particular numbers are changed.
a. Application to the Chrysler Bankruptcy. -The Chrysler bankruptcy provides an illustrative application of Method One.60 Admittedly, the Chrysler case is much more complicated than the binary choice between reorganization and liquidation to preserve jobs, as it involved a government bailout (at least temporarily using taxpayer money) and a questionable distribution to creditors.61 Nevertheless, Chrysler's bank-58. See infra Table 1. 59. This analysis leaves out other potentially relevant factors. For example, the "ta that creditors face is collected during the recession, which may be more disruptive t taxes collected years after the recession, when taxpayers are likely to pay the bill for stim lus programs. Moreover, with regard to lower-income individuals, the go collects less tax revenue, especially as individuals become eligib Earned Income Tax Credit. After a waiting period, worke eligible for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), wh payments to individuals who can claim a disability; there i dence that individuals who used to work but who get laid off up for benefits under SSDI.70 Adding these various componen for workers who are unemployed for an average of at least likely yields substantial sums for the government. These s estimated using the Survey of Income and Program Participat tracks government payments to individuals and even disti 66. Note that the "worker's surplus" that is maintained by sustaining e implicitly included in the forgone cost of Keynesian stimulus. When jobs too "few" people are employed, spending one dollar to preserve a job pres surplus -that is, the difference between the amount that the worker amount she would be willing to be paid to take the job. With workers wi prevailing wages but unable to find jobs, this worker's surplus is left on t of the unemployment. Thus, the value of Keynesian stimulus would reflec sustaining employment.
67. This section covers only federal programs. State programs would a expenditures.
68. Mankiw, Macroeconomics supra note 2, at 160 ("Although the precise terms of the program differ from year to year and state to state, a typical worker covered by unemployment insurance in the United States receives 50 percent of his or her former wages for 26 weeks."). tween those laid off due to bankruptcy and othe below, S represents the total expected social-insurance gram costs per worker.72
These forgone government expenditures pro bound on the value of preserving employment bec count for Keynesian stimulus effects. During rece often try to maintain and increase employment fo The value of preserving firms teetering on the e particularly strong when there is a lack of "shovel-re President Barack Obama acknowledged that it was dif projects to get money out the door and people emp firm already in place makes it a particularly good pres taining employment because the firm is able to do so spending and employment that often results from go The government is willing to pay a certain amount lus -call this number K -purely to avoid the harm ment levels, including the loss in economic output who cannot find jobs.
Under this approach, the government would compa costs of not maximizing the value to creditors with t raising the funds for social-insurance payments (5) 74. Keynesian stimulus K only includes spending that is justified by its stimulusgenerating effect, not spending justified on the basis of reducing government expenditures. To count job-creation costs justified on the basis of avoiding government expenditures would be to count those expenditures twice.
L-R ---< alm(S + K )
Though this is a good formula for understanding th underlying the more comprehensive measure described i the measurement difficulties for Method Two are subst than for Method One. Thus, while Method Two is useful ing the "shadow value" used in Method One into its two com remainder of the Article focuses on Method One.
D. Accounting for Context Dependence
This Article argues that bankruptcy law should act to preserve employment when the unemployment rate is high. This section explores the conditions under which employment-preserving bankruptcy rules should come into effect. It describes how a policymaker could measure /, th "shadow value" of preserving a job through bankruptcy in Method One Economic theory suggests that when unemployment is high, sustainin employment and spending has a Keynesian multiplier, which does not exist when unemployment is low.75 The positive externality for othe workers of keeping workers employed exists when unemployment is high but not when it is low. Thus, to determine times when overall unemployment can be reduced through bankruptcy law, a judge or policymaker should measure the unemployment rate for the labor market relevant for a worker in a particular time, place, and line of work. Fortunately, as thi section emphasizes, the information necessary to make such measurements is available to decisionmakers on a timely basis.
The first input into the relevant unemployment rate that a worker faces is the national unemployment rate.76 The overall macroeconomy is the primary driver of unemployment and thus an important indicator fo how much a job saved in bankruptcy will reduce overall unemployment Furthermore, workers can change location and professions, so looking showing how unemployment will change with time, t unemployment forecasts give an indication of future e A third consideration is the appropriate geographic "macroeconomy." Over time, people move to plac ment from places of high unemployment.79 But, esp run, the United States does not have one national labor market but rather many submarkets. So bankruptcy law needs to choose the relevant macroeconomy, which may be as disaggregated as the metropolitan area or as aggregated as the whole country. Which is more appropriate depends on the relevant labor market for the worker, and that in turn depends on how mobile workers are. Precisely determining how to weigh local versus national unemployment rates is beyond the scope of this Article. Both, however, are relevant to this Article given limited mobility.
Estimates of local unemployment rates are also available at a high Finally, the type of worker who would be laid off should role in determining the contexts in which employment-prese ruptcy law would be most valuable. Just as there is not one n market geographically, there are distinct labor markets for dif of workers. For example, in the recent downturn, job prospec skilled workers were substantially stronger than those fo workers.81 Thus, in such a downturn, government expenditur skilled workers will tend to be lower and the macrostimulus benefits from preserving their jobs will be lower, since they are likely to be employed relatively quickly even without help from bankruptcy law.82 Data on unemployment rates by type of worker are available as quickly as the national unemployment rate. In the same first-Friday-of-the-month data release, the Bureau of Labor Statistics also releases unemployment by sector, race, sex, age, educational attainment, and other features that could be taken into account by bankruptcy law.83
III. Implementing Counter-Cyclical Bankruptcy Law
This Article argues for bankruptcy law's inclusion of a targeted c cern for employment preservation, not the general pro-reorganiz policy supported by the Supreme Court and some bankruptcy scholar Thus, ideally pro-reorganization features would not be "baked in" system regardless of the state of the economy. This section proposes in which the bankruptcy system could incorporate counter-cyclical b ruptcy rules. 84. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text (noting pro-reorganization policy announced by Supreme Court and citing scholars that support such a policy) .
A. Implementation Using § 1112(b) Under Current Stat
One important point at which bankruptcy judg liquidating and reorganizing a firm arises when a par motion to convert from a reorganization to a liquidat der § 1112(b).85 This section provides that, "on re interest," a court may convert a Chapter 1 1 case to a cause, depending on what "is in the best interests estate."86 "Cause" is then defined in § 1112(b)(4).87 voked type of "cause" is that there will be "substantia to or diminution of the estate and the absence of a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation."88 The judge has substantial discretion over the mean ing of "reasonable."89 Although the statute does not suggest an explic comparison of the liquidation and reorganization values, the macroeco nomic context should enter the calculus for defining when the probability of rehabilitation crosses the threshold of reasonableness; that probability could be lower in times when preserving employment is important.90
Structural bias in bankruptcy law leads to firm managers filing "too many" reorganization petitions, effectively giving judges the opportunity to choose which should be liquidations and which reorganizations. Firm managers file the vast majority of bankruptcy filings, and they tend to prefer Chapter 11 reorganizations over Chapter 7 liquidations.91 This preference creates an agency problem that drives the structural bias in favor of reorganization petitions. Since firm managers wish to keep their jobs, and managers are more likely to keep their jobs in a reorganization than in a liquidation, it is widely believed that there is a strong bias toward filing using Chapter 11 instead of Chapter 7, even when the Rev. 949, 981 (1985) (noting that reasonableness invites both consideration of diverse normative criteria and substantial discretion).
90. Macroeconomists argue that it is important that inefficient firms disappear so that more efficient firms take their place. For example, Professors Ricardo J. Caballero, Takeo Hoshi, and Anil K. Kashyap argue that loans from Japanese banks to firms that would have been insolvent absent these loans prolonged the Japanese stagnation that began in the early 1990s. Ricardo J. Caballero, Takeo Hoshi & Anil K. Kashyap, Zombie Lending and Depressed Restructuring in Japan, 98 Am. Econ. Rev. 1943 Rev. , 1944 Rev. (2008 .
This option does not include long-term subsidies -or indeed, any subsidies at all. After restructuring, the firm will have to remain solvent to avoid going into bankruptcy again. The court may issue any order, process, or judgment th necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of th No provision of this title providing for the raising of an i a party in interest shall be construed to preclude the from, sua sponte, taking any action or making any dete tion necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement cou ders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of process.94
On its face, this provision gives judges broad discretion, th provision is still delimited by the Bankruptcy Code and used s Overall, given the text of the statute, its legislative history, Court rulings,96 it seems likely that judges have discretion to counter-cyclical bankruptcy rules.
In light of these provisions, this Article's proposal actually judicial discretion rather than expands it. Bankruptcy judges a sider the effects of employment when deciding petitions und S. 198, 204 (1983) Implementing counter-cyclical bankruptcy rules only calls for a few additional pieces of information that a judge could input into a standard formula: the number of employees working at the firm, the state of the national and local economy, the timing in the business cycle, and the types of workers.100 The analysis admittedly involves some parameters that are difficult to measure exactly, but the educated guesswork involved need not greatly complicate the proceedings. Management's experts (who will tend to favor reorganization) and creditors' experts (who will tend to favor liquidation) can add this small amount of information to their 100. See supra section II. C (explaining the factors useful for deciding whether a given firm is worth preserving); infra Table 1 and accompanying text (applying these factors, along with example assumptions, to a particular context) . 101. Another point at which a bankruptcy judge could conceivably implement counter-cyclical bankruptcy rules is under § 1129, which determines when a judge shall confirm a bankruptcy reorganization plan. Before confirmation, a judge could demand that a plan involve fewer layoffs, for example. The judge's statutory authority to demand such a change, however, is quite limited. Under § 1129(a) (11), a plan must be feasible; the section requires that "[confirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by liquidation, or the need for further financial reorganization, of the debtor or any successor to the debtor under the plan." 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (11). It seems difficult to argue then that a judge could demand more employment in the name of feasibility when such increases in employment are, if anything, likely to reduce the feasibility of the plan. When choosing between two plans that satisfy the conditions of § 1129, however, the judge could consider employment implications. many opportunities in which bankruptcy judges can and do reorganization. At virtually each stage of the bankruptcy pr judges exercise discretion in ways that make reorganization m likely. These decisions will affect the value of the reorganized fi expense of various other parties whose ex ante incentives are dist the knowledge that they may face cancellation of their contractu in the bankruptcy proceedings.
Take the recent example of the bankruptcy of Patriot Coal, a company operating in a high-unemployment industry (coal minin high-unemployment time (early 2013), in a high-unemploym (Appalachia).102 A key issue in the bankruptcy was whether Patr could cancel the collective bargaining agreement of its un employees, roughly a third of its total employees, under sect and 1114 of the bankruptcy code. In deciding to grant Patriot Co tion to reject its collective bargaining agreement, the bankrup said that among the questions affecting the court's decision was come for "the current employees; the fate of the rank and fi miners."103 The court also asked, "What effect will this Cour have on local economies, particularly those in mining commun thrive on the patronage of those affected by the outcom In rejecting the union's collective bargaining agreement, th unionized employees and pensioners lost, but the firm's employe all, government finances, and the local economy won. The r transformed the company from one in which the liquidation greater than the reorganization value to the reverse, and the has now successfully emerged from bankruptcy reorganized.106 cyclical bankruptcy rules justify such actions under the right circumstances.
Bankruptcy judges already make many similar decisions. The court can effectively set a higher or lower threshold for marginal cases in decid- ing when to lift the "automatic stay," which prevent exercising their contractual rights so that the deb reorganize.107 When staying other parties' repossessi the availability of the debtor's assets to pay off the o court therefore prevents other parties from exercisin rights, the court can be more or less stringent in protection."108 The court also plays a substantial r the debtor can use, sell, or lease property.109 The list bankruptcy judge must make continues throug bankruptcy process. The key point is that bankruptcy make decisions to help firms reorganize at the exp contractual rights.
C. Statutory Changes to Implement Counter-Cyclical Bankr
An alternative to adopting counter-cyclical legal ru rent bankruptcy code is to change the statute, th broad range of options. Any of the options discus dress the weakness of the proposals above that, althou biases in favor of a reorganization plan being propose in fact be proposed for a bankruptcy judge to have alter her rulings to favor maintaining employmen times. Exploring these options fully is beyond the but a few possibilities are worth mentioning. 110. This result flows naturally from the analysis in the Artic the loss to creditors is less than the amount that the govern through conventional programs to sustain employment, the go creditors to preserve the firm for an amount less than it wo These are precisely the cases the analysis above attempted to which maintaining employment is not worth it.
111. "Moral hazard" is the name for the response of actors to k be compensated if something bad happens to them. Actors e choose to adopt more of a behavior that could lead to the bad o driver engaging in moral hazard drives more dangerously if she will pay to fix the car if an accident occurs. See, e.g., Tom Bak Moral Hazard, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 237, 238-39 (1996) (defining the and investigating its genealogy). In this Article's case, firms mi with the knowledge that they could get government financing if t A second possibility is to give the government priority in bankruptcy reorganization plans in order to lend addition plans when it would be efficient to preserve jobs but credi opt to do so.112 The government could become a pseudobankruptcy proceedings. Or the government's right could proposing a reorganization plan. However, while giving the a voice would allow it to encourage the reorganization of th ing another voice could complicate already very litigious and invite some of the same problems arising from the pr government expenditure to preserve companies. A third possi give the employees themselves the opportunity to propose tion plan or priority in voting for a bankruptcy plan comme the job-preserving benefits. This possibility could follow othe for giving employees a vote in order to promote efficient ban other grounds.113 However, such an approach may create the that would arise if the government were awarded a priority v proceedings.114
IV. Example Application
To illustrate how this methodology of taking into account macroec nomic context in bankruptcy proceedings would work, consider two c in which judges exhibited an explicit goal of promoting reorganiza Both cases were filed in the first half of 2013, when unemployment w still elevated in the United States but with variations among indus and locations.115 In one case, the efficiency considerations that under counter-cyclical bankruptcy rules support the outcome; in the other, do not. First, in the Patrìot Coal case described in section III.B above, t 112. Another possible statutory change would be to explicitly introduce public-int considerations into a judge's decision to approve a plan, as is the case for antitrust s ments under the Tunney Act. 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (2012).
113. In particular, Professor Anthony J. Casey has suggested that the "option-pre ing" priority given junior creditors like employees maximizes efficiency in the face of incentives that drive senior creditors to maximize their own gain at the expense of creditors. See Anthony J. Casey, The Creditors' Bargain and Option-Preservation Pr in Chapter 11, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 759, 792-96 (2011) (discussing the option-preser priority mechanism); see also Donald S. Bernstein & James E. Millstein, ABI Commi Redemption Option Value Explained, 34 Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 10, 11, 57 (2015) (discus the implementation of such a proposal).
114. In addition to playing a role in reorganization, the government or emplo could play a role in § 363 asset sales. court considered the effects of "highly likely loss need them most -the rank and file [workers]"116 that promoted reorganization. The judge found tha saved the "overwhelming majority" of Patriot Co from unemployment and noted the very high une miners in Appalachia, where Patriot Coal mined.11 number of workers facing such a difficult macroecon the liquidation value of the firm would have to be than the reorganization value for liquidation to be eff This benefit of a job preserved then needs to be compa L-R cost of a job preserved through bankruptcy, As described in II.C.l, the numerator of the formula is the difference between tion value (L) and reorganization value ( R ), and the denominato number of jobs directly preserved by reorganizing rather than liq ing the firm (D). Figure 1 shows this comparison between the benefit and cost of serving a job. If the reorganization value is greater than the liq value (i.e., the cost of a job saved is negative), the firm should defi be reorganized. At the other extreme, if the cost of a job saved is 124. Compare In re Patriot Coal Corp., 493 B.R. 65, 137 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 20 ing that if the debtors liquidate, the majority of their employees will lose their jo In re Surgical Assoes ., 2013 WL 1176233 at *6 (denying a motion to dismiss part the debtor's dissolution would "jeapordiz[e] the . . . economic futures of 39 emp 125. See supra section III.A for how § 1112(b) could be used. A similar analy be done using other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, as explained in section through changing the law, as explained in section III.C.
126. A more complicated model might take into account the value of preserv as the unemployment rate changes over time following a bankruptcy and the full d tion of the duration of averted unemployment, but this analysis does not consi factors. Also, for simplicity, this Article ignores discounting, which is likely not a factor over the time ranges considered here.
than /, the firm should definitely not be reorga though, when the cost of a job saved is between 0 an bankruptcy rules make a difference. Turning to measuring the benefit of preserving a job J, the analysi depends upon measuring the unemployment rate for affected worke
To measure this rate, one must make several choices; other decisions would also be reasonable. In the calculations presented here, four factors affect u : the national average unemployment rate, the unemployment rate of the state in which the firm's workers are employed, the unemployment rate of individuals with characteristics (in this case, educational attainment) typical of the firm's workers, and the expected future unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate must then be translated into the value of a preserved job. To calculate / as a function of u over this time period, the $60,096 value per job for the most recent recession is pegged to an unemployment rate of 9.45%, which was the average unemployment rate of 2009-2010.127 This value per job is then phased out to zero dollars as the unemployment rate drops to the "natural rate of unemployment."128
For the natural rate of unemployment, the estimate of 6.20% by Professors Douglas Staiger, James H. Stock, and Mark Watson is used.129 At this unemployment rate, the value of a job saved is zero. 128. In particular, this value is linearly scaled out as the unemployment rate for affected workers drops from the unemployment rate during the recession of 9.45% to the natural rate of unemployment. To apply this framework, suppose Acme Corp. is lo Michigan, typically employs high-school graduates wit education, and went bankrupt in February 2009. In March is deciding whether to liquidate or reorganize the firm i motion. First, the judge would need to calculate the value o /, which depends upon the unemployment rate for affecte
The information with which to calculate u is available from two sources.
These data, along with the relevant assumptions and sources, are listed in When considering whether to convert Acme Corp.'s b proceedings into a Chapter 7, the judge should then compa fit of preserving jobs to the costs of preserving a job, as calcu timating the liquidation value (L), reorganization value (/ number of workers that Acme Corp. employs. For this calcula to the figures in this Article's initial example. Suppose tha tion value of Acme Corp. is $1,500,000, the reorganiza $1,000,000, and the number of jobs preserved is 1,000. The saved is therefore $500, which is far less than the value of a j $51,775. This firm should be reorganized, producing $51, value and avoiding the distortion resulting from $125,000 ernment expenditures at a cost of $500,000 to creditors. D sumptions would yield different numbers, but this examp how the benefits of preserving a firm can greatly exceed doing so.
V. Responding to Potential Critiques
A. Institutional Competency of the Bankruptcy System Though, as described earlier, counter-cyclical bankruptcy rules need not be implemented through the current bankruptcy system,137 a natural critique of implementing them through the current system is that bankruptcy judges lack the necessary competence. First, bankruptcy judges already exercise a tremendous amount of discretion and take employment effects into account.139 Bankruptcy 136. Another parameter that could be changed in the calculation is how this number is scaled down. Here, the figure was scaled down linearly, but it could be scaled down more quickly or slowly. Or an entirely different method of calculating it could be used. exercise their discretion in a way that favors the firm.142 Hence, the counter-cyclical bankruptcy r judges to exercise any discretion that they do not instead only to exercise it more effectively; such rule put a thumb on the scale in favor of reorganizat unemployment and that they refrain from doing so in ployment. The crucial data on unemployment rate ble,143 and I suggest a method of applying the data s actually constrains judicial discretion.
Finally, even conceding that it might be undesirab judges to have the additional burden of judging the conomy, the right question is not whether bankru decisionmakers for this purpose. Rather, the question the best available decisionmakers in this arena. It mig an omniscient and benevolent social planner decide stay in existence via reorganization, but no such insti left with the institutions we have -and, therefore, if a substantial amount of money at relatively little exp no statutory changes are made, then bankruptcy ju ones to implement counter-cyclical bankruptcy rul to keep bankruptcy law and job-creating government Another potential critique of this Article's proposal is that bankruptcy, firms can liquidate as much as they please, bankruptcy law's attempts to preserve firms intact if they ruptcy. This proposal would then yield an asymmetry betw cyclical rules within bankruptcy and the absence of such rule bankruptcy, causing different treatment for similar firms in side of bankruptcy. Such an asymmetry could deter use of th system, with its associated orderly procedures, and instea settlement of affairs outside of the bankruptcy system. Ther sponses to this critique.
First, the scope of the asymmetry may be rather limited, that would ideally be affected by counter-cyclical rules are li the bankruptcy system; therefore, few firms that would have candidates for reorganization under counter-cyclical bank will liquidate outside of bankruptcy. The reason for the lim the asymmetry is that counter-cyclical bankruptcy rules are li a firm with similar reorganization and liquidation values -a f other words, is a close candidate for being reorganized. T firms is likely to enter bankruptcy because those making the enter the system have a preference for reorganization, so tha keep their jobs145 and reorganization is easier within the ban tem. Indeed, the automatic stay and other hallmark featu ruptcy are designed to solve the collective action problem 145. See Jackson 8c Skeel, supra note 7, at 24-25 (noting that firms and their employees have incentives to prefer reorganization over liquidation).
146. See Thomas H. Jackson 8c Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors ' Bargain, 75 Va. L. Rev. 155, 160 (1989) (noting that resolving such collective action problems is a "principal justification" for bankruptcy law) .
Second, as with the issue of institutional compet for solving this problem may not exist. All else equal cies inside and outside of bankruptcy may be ideal. B option while having counter-cyclical bankruptcy r best to have different treatments inside and outside inefficiency could arise from a small number of firm from entering bankruptcy due to counter-cyclical ba that efficiency should be taken into account in the ru it would be too onerous to implement similar poli ruptcy because the government lacks tools to do so d is undesirable to include such rules within bankruptc C. Alternative Policies Would Be Superior It may be more efficient for bankruptcy law to p during recessions than to have laid-off employees rel state and government stimulus programs given the the taxpayer. This is not a sufficient argument for im cyclical bankruptcy rules if there is another option rior to either such bankruptcy rules or existing go For example, some have argued that job-training more effective in helping those unemployed due However, job training does not help those who cann empirical evidence suggests the limited effectiveness the time horizon relevant for sustaining employm sion.148 Others have suggested that unemployment unemployed find jobs. However, this assistance ap help. Interviews with unemployment counselors sugg lot of effort, it can be difficult to find a job duri simply are not enough jobs to go around, and mo market will not change that.149
The existence of a policy that would be more effic cyclical bankruptcy rules at reducing costs to th unemployment cannot be ruled out. However, it silver bullet would come from. Congress's effort t ment during the Great Recession was certainly not pe sents a good guess of the policies that can be used to reduce unemployment during recessions-and the program was very expen- sive.150 Congress simply did not find cheap ways of sustai ment. And this "good guess" is the very set of programs Article as a measure of costs. The key point is that such prog a cost on taxpayers, and in some cases, that burden can be stantially through bankruptcy law at relatively little cost to cr D. Re-Entry into Bankruptcy Fourth, one might be concerned that firms with a grea tion value than reorganization value are likely to fall bac ruptcy. Indeed, these so-called "Chapter 22s" (because of Chapter 11 filing) are quite common, perhaps partly due to "pro-reorganization" bias in bankruptcy law.151 However perspective developed in this Article, re-entry into bankruptc ganization is not necessarily a bad thing. Even if the factor liquidates, delaying the time at which its workers enroll in M other government programs is valuable, especially if the o ruptcy proceedings occurred at the trough of a recession. some reappearances make sense even in good times. Whet firm will succeed is usually uncertain, so many firms that ha expected value will file again. But, during recessions, even mo firms should stay around -and then refile later, during bette times, because of their positive employment effects in the sho E. Few Bankruptcies Take Place During Times of High Unemploy A final potential critique is that few bankruptcies take pla times of high unemployment. It is true that the unemploy often low. However, as Figure 2 shows, bankruptcy filings counter-cyclical; there are many more when the unemploy high.153 As a result, the fraction of bankruptcies that occ 152. A related concern might be the § 1129 requirement that, for ajudge to approve a plan of reorganization, the judge must find that "the plan is not likely to be followed by the liquidation, or the need for further financial reorganization." 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (11) (2012). However, as described in section III.B, after the variety of steps that judges take in the name of promoting reorganization, firms affected by counter-cyclical bankruptcy rules are likely to exit in a relatively strong position and will likely not face liquidation upon exit.
Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, Databases, Tables 8c
Calculators by Subject, Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/ LNU04000000 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (select "1980" in "From" date field;  economy is in a recession is higher than the fract economy is in a recession. Also, even if only a small cies are affected, the stakes are large, as the Chrysle Preserving jobs through bankruptcy during recess to save the government considerable resources and efficiency. This Article argues that an efficient bankruptcy law sho preserve employment during recessions. Preserving jobs when ployment rate is high reduces the need for government expend social-insurance payments and leads to Keynesian multiplier crease overall employment and efficiency in the economy. W change in the law, judges could implement such a counter-c using § 1112(b) and other sections of the Bankruptcy Code. could enact statutory changes to permit government expe reorganizations or grant the government quasi-creditor stat ruptcy proceedings. This Article has also discussed relevant the local and forecasted unemployment rates and shown t readily available to help consider these factors. This Article gue that, on average, bankruptcy law should be any more e preserving than it is now or that judges should have more disc then select "2012" in "To" date field; then select "Go" hyperlink) (last v 2016).
154. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
ther, this Article argues that, during times of high unemploy or other policymakers should use the method proposed herein employment in some cases. These counter-cyclical bankruptcy strain judicial discretion in the interest of greater efficiency recessions, this Article supports the traditional law and eco ment that bankruptcy law should maximize the return to cre More broadly, the Article suggests a framework for think macroeconomic considerations in the law. The methodology ing the shadow value of a job saved could be applied to other a law. For example, the goal of preserving jobs more cost-effec times of high unemployment could inform cost-benefit analy tions. Such policies would increase efficiency, help encour recovery, and maintain employment for workers desperate jobs.
